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THE PLIGHT OF THE DISPLACED EMPLOYEE
IMPROVES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1983
CHANGES TO MINNESOTA'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEM
PAUL

G.

CROCHIEREt

The Minnesota Workers' Compensationsystem has been the subject of
considerablecriticism over the past severalyears. Specifically, Minnesota 's benefit and rehabilitationprogram for permanently partially
disabled workers was the brunt of much of this criticism. This criticism lead to several studies which recommended a variety of changes
in Minnesota's workers' compensation scheme. These studies lead to
the 1983 amendments of the Minnesota's Workers' Compensation
Act. This Article discusses the problems posed by the previous statute,
the recommended changes, and the 1983 enactment. This Article also
explains how the benefit and rehabilitationscheme functions under the
recent amendments.
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INTRODUCTION

A "displaced employee" is an employee who, as a result of
permanent disability caused by a work-related injury, cannot
return to his pre-injuryjob, but can perform other work within
medical restrictions. The displaced employee is an expensive
problem. The most obvious cost to the employee is the physical injury itself. Other costs, though, are also very real. A
physical injury or illness may result in extended disability from
work and home activities. With physical disability often comes
emotional disability in the forms of fear, frustration, anger,
and confusion. A severely disabled worker may have to change
careers if he cannot return to the pre-injury job and compete
for a newjob. While statutory workers' compensation benefits
are designed to provide an injured employee with a decent
standard of living during recuperation, theory and practice do
not always coincide, and some employees become destitute as
a result of their work-related injuries. If an injured employee
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/7
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encounters resistance to a claim for benefits, that employee
suffers the added costs of paying attorney's fees and developing an adversarial relationship with the employer.
An employer also suffers significant costs when an employee
is injured on thejob. First, the employer must replace the employee during the disability period. Replacing an employee requires training a new hiree or transferring another employee
from a different function. The interruption in the work flow
and the retraining time cause inefficiency and a loss of productivity. An employer also incurs expense for the injured employee's medical, rehabilitation, indemnity, and other workers'
compensation benefits. To the extent the employer is insured
for workers' compensation losses, the employer's insurance
premiums will likely rise after a work-related injury. If an employer disputes the compensability of an employee's claim, the
employer may incur legal expense, including not only attorney
fees, but also time the employer and key employees must
spend preparing for and testifying in litigation. Finally, a disputed workers' compensation claim can lead to distrust between the employer and its employees, as well as general
deterioration of labor relations.
When a worker is injured on the job, society pays for the
injury in several ways. First, because workers' compensation is
based on the enterprise liability principle,' consumers pay a
higher price for the employer's product. Also, taxpayers directly support the Department of Labor and Industry and the
Office of Administrative Hearings, the agencies responsible for
processing workers' compensation claims. The more injuries
and litigation processed through state agencies, the higher the
tax cost. To the extent high workers' compensation insurance
costs and benefit costs drive employers from the state, the public suffers through lost jobs and tax revenue. If workers' compensation benefits are not payable and the employee does not
1. Enterprise liability theory provides that the consumer price of a product
should reflect all costs, including workers' compensation costs, attributable to the
product. Thus, if Widget A and Widget B are comparable in every respect except
that the process for making Widget A generates more workers' compensation costs
than does the process for making Widget B, then the comsumer price for Widget A
should exceed that of Widget B. See gene)ally L. I)ARIN;-HAMMOND & R. KNIESNER,
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 3-4 (1980); 1 A. LARSON.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCU'ATIONA. INJITRIES AND DEATII § 2-20 (Desk ed.
1985).
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return to work, society supports the employee and her dependents through social security or other government assistance.
Finally, society suffers from a human perspective when some of
its own members become disabled and can no longer partici2
pate in life as fully as before.
Obviously, a displaced employee is entitled to compensation
from the employer. However, reasonable questions may arise
as to the amount of compensation, the type of compensation,
and the purpose for which the compensation is given. Should
the employee's wages be replaced totally or should the employee be placed at a level just above that of destitution? 3 How
should the timing of the benefits be regulated? Should the
4
benefits be received on a weekly basis or in a lump sum? If
the employee's compensation benefits are too high, will this
create a disincentive for the employee to return to work? If the
benefits are too low, will the employee be unable to maintain a
decent standard of living? Should consumer interest in low
product prices and employer concerns about minimizing workers' compensation costs be considered?
Few would dispute that a displaced worker is entitled to be
reimbursed for all medical costs related to the work injury. A
separate issue is whether the displaced employee is entitled to
rehabilitation or retraining benefits. At what point in the employee's disability should these benefits commence? Should
the benefits be mandatory or optional? Are rehabilitation or
retraining always necessary? Are they cost effective? Who
should monitor rehabilitation and retraining programs?
Since a disabled employee is unable to return to his pre-injury job, a return to work with the pre-injury employer would
require the employer to either modify the original job, create a
new job to fit the employee's restrictions, or take another employee off a light duty job. An employer may not want a displaced employee back on any job. If the displaced employee
2. See

MINNESOTA

INSURANCE

DIVISION,

SOTA: AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
DIVISION RECOMMENDATIONS].

'ORKERS'

COMPENSATION

(1982) [hereinafter cited as

IN MINNE-

INSURANCE

3. According to Professor Arthur Larson, in classic workers' compensation theory, benefits are designed to forestall destitution by SLpplying regular periodic income. Larson, The lf'age-Loss Principle in llorkers' Compensation. 6 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 501, 512 (1980).
4. See id. at 512-13; Kirwin, ,.mlys.is of Recenti11"keI" Compensation Developments. 8
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 847. 929-31 (1982); Kirwin, IloIlk'e'Cofpenisatioi Benefit Ideas,
39 BENCH & B. MINN. Dec. 1982, at 31, 32.
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does not return to work with the original employer, the next
option is to look to other employers. A prospective employer
will be concerned about being responsible for an aggravation
or reinjury. A second employer might infer from the refusal of
the original employer to take the employee back to work that
the employee is a problem worker. The displaced employee
may have to forfeit skills developed in the pre-injury job, and
consequently be forced to reenter the job market as an unskilled, entry-level applicant.
Responsibility for the employee's retraining and reentry into
the job market is another problem posed by the displaced employee issue. If no one takes responsibility, the employee will
continue to be without ajob and without all the financial, emotional, and social benefits that come with it. Arguably, the employer should be responsible for the employee's recovery
because the injury would not have happened but for the employment situation. Since workers' compensation benefits are
awarded in a no-fault system, however, placing full responsibility on the employer for the employee's recovery hardly seems
fair. The employer has no opportunity to show that the injury
was not the employer's fault.
Logically, the employee and employer must share the responsibility for recovery. The government as a representative
of society also has a role in the employee's recovery. The government can monitor the recovery process and monitor the efforts of the employee and employer. Further, the government
has available to it resources that may be unavailable to an employee or employer. To the extent these resources enable an
employee to return to work and recover more quickly, society
benefits by their application.
Minnesota's treatment in the 1970s and the early 1980s of
the displaced employee was criticized widely. Detailed studies
of the problems of the pre-1983 Minnesota workers' compensation system were conducted by a specially commissioned
state Workers' Compensation Study Commission, 5 the MinneA REPORT TO TIlE
(1979) 1hereinafter cited as STUD1 COIMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS1. The Workers' Compensation Study Commission was established in order to improve the system of providing workers' compensation
insurance at fair and reasonable rates to employers within the state. Id. at 1. The
Commission was given charge to study and report on:
(a) the procedure by which workers' compensation insurance premium rates
5.

MINNESOTA WORKERS'

COMIPENSATION STunv COMMISSION,

MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR
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sota Insurance Division, 6 the Citizens League, 7 and the Univer-

sity of Minnesota Industrial Relations Center." Although these
studies concentrated on diverse areas of the system, common
conclusions were that the workers' compensation system in
Minnesota was inefficient, expensive, confusing, and at times,
misguided. The critics made specific recommendations for
improvement.
Based on the findings of the various studies as well as on
intense political pressure from the business sector to reduce
the costs of workers' compensation in Minnesota, the legislature made major revisions to the Workers' Compensation Act
in 1983.9 This Article will review the criticism of the pre-1983
statute, explain the 1983 statutory changes as they affect the
displaced employee, and discuss the practical implications of
the new law with respect to the displaced employee.' 0 The
analysis will consider the system's treatment of the displaced
employee from the perspectives of the employee, the employer, I" and society as a whole.
are established; (b) the level of Minnesota workers' compensation premiums
as compared to premium levels in other jurisdictions; (c) the various methods of providing workers' compensation insurance to employers in other
jurisdictions; (d) the administration of the law by the department of labor
and industry and workers' compensation court of appeals; and (e) the expense factor in the rate in terms of whether the factor is inadequate or
excessive.
Id. at 2.
6.

INSURANCE DIVISION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 55. The report dis-

cusses benefit operations.
7.

CITIZENS LEAGUE, WORKERS'

COMPENSATION REFORM:

GET TIlE EMPLOYEES

BACK ON THE JOB (1982) 1hereinafter citcd as GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON THEJOBj.
8. C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS.JR., R. AZEVEDO, M. GONANNO, AND P. SCHUMANN, MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND COSTS: AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
(1983) [hereinafter cited as UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT].
9. See Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310 (codified in scattered
sections of MINN. STAT. ch. 43A. 79, 147, 148, 175, 176, 176A, 268, 471, 346 (1984)).
10. Excluded from the scope of this paper arc discussions of detailed procedural
issues regarding administrative conferences and appellate procedures, insurance rate
issues and other insurance matters, workers' compensation systems of other states,
and the intricate permanent partial disability schedules and medical fee schedules.
Also excluded from the scope of this Article are several relatively minor changes to
the workers' compensation statute passed subsequent to the 1983 amendments. See
Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, 1984 Minn. Laws 97; Act of May 22, 1985, ch. 234,
§§ 3-18, 1985 Minn. Laws 739, 745-54; Act of June 27. 1985, ch. 13, § 273. 1985
Minn. Laws 2072, 2253 (Firsi Special Session).
11. Because most of Minnesota's employees work for sell'-instred employers, references to employers will assume self-insured status, unless otherwise indicated.
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I.

PRIOR TO THE

A.

1983

AMENDMENTS

What the System Provided

Prior to 1984, Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Act was
intended to "assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable
cost to the employers who are subject to the provisions of
chapter 176."12 The workers' compensation law was deemed
remedial social legislation which was to be liberally construed
3
on behalf of the worker.'
Under the former statute, a displaced employee was eligible
for weekly indemnity benefits to compensate for lost earning
capacity as a result of the work-related injury. For an injury
producing temporary total disability, the employee was entitled to two-thirds of his daily wage at the time of injury. This
payment was subject to a maximum indemnity payment of the
statewide average weekly wage and a minimum payment of
twenty percent of the statewide average weekly wage.' 4 Temporary total disability could be unlimited in duration; it was
payable during the entire period of disability, with payments to
be made at the intervals when the wage was payable. While the
statute defined total disability as an "injury which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which
brings him an income,"' 5 the functional test to determine temporary total disability was set forth in Schulte v. C.H. Peterson
Construction Co. 16 Schulte required employees to prove inability
12. Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 52, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1641 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (1984)).
13. See, e.g., Savina v. Litton Indus./Litton Medical Sys., 330 N.W.2d 456, 457-58
(Minn. 1983) (statute of limitations); Fuller v. Farmers' Coop. Oil Ass'n, 322 N.W.2d
359, 360-61 (Minn. 1982) (procedural rules to be liberally construed); Chillstrom v.
Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 480, 65 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1954) (admission of
evidence); Kaletha v. Hall Merchantile Co., 157 Minn. 290, 293, 196 N.W. 261, 262
(1923) (injury caused by cigarette smoking held to arise out of and in the course of
employment). But see Kaste v. Mark Sand & Gravel, 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec.
226, 228 (1984) (liberal construction rule deals only with the kind of activities and
injuries to which the workers' compensation law applies, not with the weight to be
given evidence nor with the burden of proof).
14. Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 342, § 12, 1977 Minn. Laws 697, 703-09 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1 (1984)).
15. Id. (codified at MINN. STA. § 176.101, subd. 5 (1984)).
16. Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130 (1967).
The court stated that an employee was temporarily totally disabled if:
his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in the communily, causeldl him to be
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to find and hold a job. Thus, employees were required to
make a reasonably diligent search for work to prove entitlement to benefits. If an employee did not search for work, the
court had no basis upon which to determine whether the employee was temporarily totally disabled.17
If an injury permanently and totally incapacitated an employee
from working at any occupation which could bring him an income, the employee was eligible for permanent total disability
benefits.' 8 Permanent total disability benefits were paid weekly
in the same amount as temporary total disability benefits. Permanent total benefits lasted for the lifetime of the employee
and were subject to annual escalations,1 9 supplementary benefits adjustments, 2 °1 and social security offsets.21
The third type of indemnity benefits available under the former statute were temporary partial disability benefits. Temporary partial disability benefits represented two-thirds of the
difference between the daily wage of the employee at the time
of injury and the rate the employee is able to earn in the partially disabled condition.2 Temporary partial disability payments were paid at the intervals when the wage was payable
and were subject to the same maximum limit as temporary total disability benefits. 2 3 An employee entitled to temporary
partial disability benefits typically is able to work, but is subject
to certain medical restrictions.
unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in insubstantial income ....
The concept of temporary total disability is primarily dependent upon the employce's ability to find and hold ajob, not his
physical condition.
Id. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34.
17. See Ryan v. MTC Transit Operating Div., 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 97,
100 (1979).
18. Act of May 26, 1977. ch. 342. § 12, 1977 Minn. Laws 697, 703-09 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subds. 4-5 (1984)). The permanent total disability provisions
were not changed significantly by the 1983 amendments.
19. Act ofJune 1,1981. ch. 346, § 137. 1981 Minn. Laws 1611. 1687-88 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.645 (1984)). Temporarv total and temporary partial disability
benefits were and are also subject to escalation. Id.
20. Id. § 85, 1981 Minn. L.aws at 1663 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.132, subd. 2 (1984)).
21. Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 342. 1977 Minn. Laws 697. 703-09 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.101. subd. 2 (1984)).
22. Id. § 12, 1977 Minn. l.aws at 703-09 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101 subd. 2 (1984)).
23. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/7

8

19861

Crochiere: The Plight of the Displaced Employee Improves: An Analysis of the
DISPIA'CED EMPL.OYEE

An important and troublesome provision in the former temporary partial disability statute provided:
If the employer does not furnish the worker with work
which he can do in his temporary partially disabled condition and he is unable to procure such work with another
employer, after reasonably diligent effort, the employee
shall be paid at the full compensation rate for his or her
24
temporary total disability.
The above-quoted language resulted in some theoretical blurring of the distinction between temporary partial and temporary total disability. An employee was required to perform a
reasonably diligent search for work under Schulte to qualify for
temporary total benefits, and the employee was required to do
the same pursuant to the temporary partial statute to obtain
temporary partial benefits at the temporary total rate. In practice, most people termed the benefits "temporary partial"
when the employee returned to a lower paying job after injury
and "temporary total" when the employee returned to no job
25
at all.
In addition to indemnity benefits, the former statute provided for loss of function benefits, or permanent partial disability benefits. 2 6 Permanent partial disability was payable in a
lump sum if the employee returned to work, received permanent total disability payments, retired from the work force, or
completed a rehabilitation plan, but was not offered suitable
work by the pre-injury employer and could not procure such
work elsewhere.2 7 This last category led to disputes over the
diligence of the employee's efforts to find work with other employers. Permanent partial disability benefits were payable at
the same intervals as temporary total payments if temporary
total payments had ceased but the employee had not returned
24. Act ofJune 4, 1975, ch. 358, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1174-81, anended by
Act ofjune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 43, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1339 (eliminating the
troublesome language).
25. For a discussion of the temporary total disability/temporary partial disability
at the temporary total rate controversy, see separate opinions of Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals Judges Hanson and Adel in Feilen v. Whirlpool Corp., No.
470-34-8032, slip op. at 7-9 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. June 25, 1985).
26. Act ofJune 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1174-81, repealed by
Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1404-05.
27. Act ofJune 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 58, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1646 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3a (1984)).
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28
to work.
Under the former statute, permanent partial disability benefits were fixed amounts. The amount of permanent partial disability payable depended only on the percent of disability to a
specific body part2' and the number of weeks of compensation
attributable to such disability according to the schedule set
forth in the statute.:i(
Under both the prior law and the current law, the displaced
employee was entitled to reimbursement for all medical costs
reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the employee
from the effects of the work-related injury. 3 1 The displaced
employee was also entitled to rehabilitation or retraining benefits. 3 2 The statute provided that "vocational rehabilitation
shall train an employee so he may be returned to ajob related
to his former employment or to a job in another work area
which produces an economic status as close as possible to that
he would have enjoyed without disablity." 3 3 Within 30 days of
an employer's receipt of medical information that the employee was unable due to a personal injury or occupational disease to return to the pre-injury occupation, the employer had
to provide rehabilitation consultation for the employee. 34 If
the consultant determined rehabilitation would significantly increase the injured employee's employability, the employer and
rehabilitation consultant submitted a specific rehabilitation
plan to the commissioner. The Department of Vocational Rehabilitation was temporarily responsible for rehabilitation if
the employer refused to provide it to the employee. By failing
to submit to any reasonable examinations and evaluative pro-

28. Id.
29. Disability ratings were left entirely to the discretion of medical providers.
For a discussion of problems resulting from the lack of disability standards, see infra
text accompanying notes 163-64.
30. Act ofJune 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1174-81, repealed by
Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1404-05.
31. MINN. STAT. § 176.135 (1984), amended by Act of Mar. 25 1986, ch. 461, § 20,
1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 544, 562-63 (West).
32. Act ofJune 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws 1268, 1278-81 (extra session) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.102 (1984)).
33. Id. § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws at 1278-79, (extra session) amended by Act of June
7, 1983, ch. 290, § 69, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1349 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.102, subd. 1 (1984)).
34. Id. § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws at 1279 (extra session) amended by Act of June 7,
1983, ch. 290, § 73, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1350-52 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.102, subd. 4 (1984)).
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cedures necessary to determine the need for and details of a
rehabilitation plan, the employee risked reduction in the
amount of compensation or suspension of the right to
35
compensation.
The former statute contained a special provision guaranteeing the employee who participated in on-the-job training a
wage equal to the after-tax wage the employee earned before
the injury and provided incentives for a second employer to
hire the injured employee permanently.3 " The former statute
also provided special retraining benefits for the displaced employee. While participating in an approved retraining program, an employee was eligible for up to 156 weeks of
compensation at an amount equal to 125% of his temporary
37
total disability rate.
B.

Unwritten Strategies Under the Former Law
1.

Employer Strategies

All employers seek to reduce workers' compensation costs.
When confronted with a displaced employee under the former
system, faced responsibility for indemnity benefits, loss of
function benefits, medical benefits, and possibly rehabilitation
benefits. To reduce costs, employers sought to limit these
benefits whenever possible.
Employers could do little to limit loss of function benefits
other than to send the employee to a "defense oriented" doctor who typically would give the employee a low disability rating. To reduce medical costs, some employers actively
discouraged employees from seeing chiropractors. Certain
employers questioned the effectiveness of chiropractic treatment. Other employers objected to the number of treatments
some chiropractors claimed were necessary. Employers also
kept medical costs down by falsely instructing employees that
only the cost of a specified doctor would be reimbursed.38 1 The
company would then send the employee to "its" doctor, and
35. Id.
36. Id. § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws at 1280 (extra session), amended by Act of June 7,
1983, ch. 290, § 74, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1352-53 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.102, subd. 5 (1984 & Supp. 1985)).
37. Act ofJune 7, 1979, ch. 3,§ 36, 1979 Minn. Laws 1256, 1281 (extra session),
amendedby Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 81, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1355 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 11 (1984)).
38. This, of course, was not true. MINN. STAT. § 176.135, subd. 1 (1982) pro-
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hope the doctor would indicate that further medical treatment
was unnecessary and that the employee could return to work.
The practice of keeping a "defense" doctor on retainer provided the employer with fast, predictable service at a known
cost. It also discouraged employees from seeing "liberal" doctors whose findings and conclusions could prove expensive for
the employer.
To reduce or avoid rehabilitation or retraining costs, many
employers resisted scheduling rehabilitation consultations with
employees until required by law to do so. Some employers did
not actively encourage rehabilitation because it meant additional costs in the short run and because questioned its long
term effectiveness of rehabilitation. 3 1 There also was confusion as to what "rehabilitation" involved. Before 1979, "rehabilitation" meant "retraining."40
Retraining was often
expensive, time-consuming, and ineffective. 4 1 Not all employers understood that "rehabilitation" under the 1979 amendments
also
included
medical
evaluation,
physical
rehabilitation, work evaluation and counseling, job modification, and other measures short of actual retraining programs. 4 2
To employers who were not self-insured, it was often easier to
refuse to bring a displaced employee back to work and let the
insurance company worry about future job placement than to
get involved with extensive retraining programs. To self-insured employers, the uncertain effectiveness of rehabilitation
and its very certain costs made it unattractive.
Retraining was unattractive to employers for two reasons.
First, an employee in a retraining program was eligible for
125% of the compensation that would be due if the employee
were receiving temporary total disability benefits. 4 3 Second,
retraining programs often took from several months to several
years to complete. 44 Employers were reluctant to admit that
the employee could not find some other job within the time it
vided for reimbursement of any health care costs reasonably required to "cure and
relieve from the effects of the injury."
39. UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 190-91.
40. J. BENANAV & S. KEEFE, Two TIER IN MINNESOTA 61 (1984).
41. See GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON THE JOB, supra note 7, at 30.
42. See INSURANCE DIVISION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 144.

43. Act ofJune 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws 1256, 1281 (extra session)
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 11 (1984)).
44. J. BENANAV & S. KEEFE, supra note 39, at 62; see UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, supra
note 8, at 196.
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took the employee to complete a retraining program. These
generalizations did not apply in every case. To the extent they
did apply, however, they frustrated the system.
The most elaborate cost avoidance efforts were made by employers in the area of indemnity benefits. The displaced employee typically received temporary total disability benefits.
The employer could reduce indemnity costs several ways. The
most obvious was by providing the employee a job at the same
wage rate. Presuming that the displaced employee was unable
to return to the pre-injuryjob, the employer had to offer a different or modified job to the employee. While many employers did offer legitimate modified jobs to displaced employees,
other employers found techniques to shortcut the system. For
example, the employer might offer a job which on its face was
within the employee's restrictions, but which actually required
45
exertions beyond those approved by the employee's doctor.
The employee might attempt to perform the job temporarily,
but be unable to continue in it. The employer would then assert that it owed no further indemnity benefits to the employee
because it had offered the employee a job within the restrictions and the employee had voluntarily quit the job. Similar
results would occur when the employer would pressure the
employee or make the job uncomfortable for the employee
through subtle means. 46 Certain employers seemed to believe
that as long as they offered the employee ajob which was generally within medical restrictions, they would be able to discontinue benefits forever.
Another technique employers used to terminate indemnity
benefits was to build a record to show that the employee was
not as disabled as the employee claimed. Employers hired private invesitagors to monitor the employees' activities. Investigators used elaboarate means to catch employees in activities
inconsistent with the alleged disability. Forms of entrapment
were sometimes employed, 4 7 and videotaping of the em45. See, e.g., Koenig v. Northern Insulation Co., 358 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn.
1984); Paulson v. Ceco Corp., 265 N.W.2d 647, 647-48 (Minn. 1978);Johnson v. Red
Wing Shoe Co., 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 522, 525 (1984), sum aft'd, id. at 529
(1985).
46. See, e.g., Shogren v. Bethesda Lutheran Medical Center, 359 N.W.2d 595, 597
(Minn. 1984); Wessling v. Briggs Transp. Co., No. 468-34-1729, slip op. at 2 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. June 6, 1985).
47. Rhoades v. Nabisco, Inc., No. 475-38-4315, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Workers'
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4
ployee's activities at home or elsewhere was common.
Employers attempted to discontinue indemnity benefits by
trying to show that employees did not conduct diligent
searches for work. Instead of offering rehabilitation assistance
to enable the employee to find a job, some employers preferred to monitor secretly the employee's search for work.
Once the employer felt the search efforts were not diligent, the
49
employer would discontinue benefits.
Of course, not all instances of employers failing to reinstate
displaced employees were attributable to employers' "dirty
tricks." Bringing the employee back to work involved certain
obstacles for the original employer. Some employers could
not or would not reinstate the employee because of the nature
of the disability. Small employers in particular had few lightduty jobs available to offer displaced employees. Presumably,
an employer had to replace the displaced employee during the
period of temporary total disability. Returning the employee
to the old job required shuffling another employee, causing
further disruption to the work force. Occasionally, union rules
precluded an employer from putting the displaced employee in
an appropriate light-duty job because the job was held by a
more senior worker.
Despite the open-ended nature of temporary total benefits
under the former system, once an employer determined that it
would not rehire a displaced employee in any job, the employer often showed little concern about the employee's return
to work. Many employers simply seemed to write this employee off as a loss unless information became available that
the employee was doing something inconsistent with medical
restrictions or was not searching for work. By ignoring the employee, the employer not only suffered increased indemnity
losses, but also did nothing to expedite the employee's rehabilitation effort.

Comp. Ct. App. May 14, 1985) ("The principles of entrapment... do not apply to
workers' compensation cases.").
48. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn.
1985); Rhoades, No. 475-38-4315, slip op. at 4; Ryan, 32 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec.
at 102 (1979) (Otto, J., dissenting).
49. E.g., Welch v. Sport Port, Inc., No. 473-60-6549, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. July 30, 1985); Lynch v. Flour City Architectural Metals, No.
474-52-8855, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1985); Westacott v. Formac Corp., 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 79, 81-82 (1984).
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2.

Employee Strategies

Just as employers tried to minimize costs, the employees attempted to maximize benefits. For some employees, temporary total benefits came close to or even exceeded pre-injury
after-tax income. 5°1 Because they experienced little or no reduction in disposable income by "going on compensation,"
some employees made the seemingly logical decision to continue receiving compensation benefits for longer than absolutely necessary. They tried accomplishing this by staying
away from the employer, by continuing to complain of pain
when most of the pain had actually subsided, and by simply not
making an effort to return to work. Not all employees guilty of
the above conduct were necessarily "bad." Many were unaware of their specific duties under the system. Many believed
they deserved some "paid vacation" for having been hurt on
the job.
Although most workers' compensation claims were paid voluntarily by employers under the former law, a significant
number of Minnesota claims involved the assistance of an attorney for the employee. 5' Once the employee hired an attorney, the process became adversarial. If the claim went to
hearing, the employee knew, or was informed by counsel, that
disability would have to be proved. Some employees believed,
not illogically, that obtaining a job shortly before trial could
cause a judge to question the diligence of the prior work
search and the severity of the alleged disability. Thus, the focus before trial at times was on sufficiently documenting disability rather than seriously seeking an appropriate job.
Employees' attorneys, who of course received larger fees for
larger recoveries, played a significant role in this
phenomenon .52
Employees were to prove they could not find work, and they
50. See UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 38-41.
51. Minnesota's litigation rate as compared to first Reports of Injury was 8.9% in
1975, 8.4% in 1977, 10.4% in 1980, and 11.1% in 1981. GETTHE EMPLOYEES BACK
ON THE JOB, supra note 7, at 13; UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 208-10.
52. For example, a 1982 publication by a workers' compensation attorney provided a form for employees' attorneys to give to clients to explain the employee's
obligations regarding a diligent search for work. See generally J. HERBULOCK, A GUIDE
TO MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1982). The form told the employees:
You cannot assume that no one will give you work. That is what you are
trying to prove. The only way you can prove it is by asking them. If you
don't have this evidence, the lawyer will not be able to prove your entitle-
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dutifully did whatever they could to do so. For example, some
employees made mechanical, uninspired, and well-documented contacts with a certain number of employers each
week. 53 The contacts often were cold calls to companies unlikely to offer employment. Another tactic was to register with
public or private employment agencies and call the agencies
periodically to check on the market.5 4 While some employees
did obtain work through agencies, other employees simply
waited for the agencies to place them in jobs; not surprisingly,
this seldom happened.
Just as employers sent employees to "defense doctors," employees' attorneys sent their clients to "plaintiff's doctors."
"Plaintiff's doctors" typically gave high disability ratings and
assigned substantial restrictions to injured employees. The
high disability ratings were used to claim higher permanent
partial disability benefits. The substantial restrictions, often
combined with instructions to avoid all work for a certain period, enhanced employees' chances of receiving temporary total benefits for longer periods of time. Unfortunately,
employees seldom received a truly neutral evaluation of their
medical condition when the only doctors they saw were doc55
tors reputed to be either conservative or liberal.
ment to disability to benefits after the doctor says you are capable of doing
some work. With the evidence you can prove your entitlement.
Id. at 80. Without further explanation by an attorney, an injured employee reading
such a form could understand his role was not to affirmatively seek employment, but
rather, to obtain sufficient documentation forjob refusals in order to prevail in court.
The subtle distinction affected the employee's entire approach and success at a "diligent search for work."
53. See, e.g., lWelch, No. 473-60-6549, slip op. at 3 (despite numerous contacts,
employee failed to exhibit a truly sincere desire to return to work); Willis v. Mathy
Constr. Co., No. 471-64-4127, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 15,
1985) (114 telephone contacts in 6 months); Engebrit v. Control Data Corp., No.
472-46-3537 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. March 29, 1984) ("mere recitation of
the number of pages and the number of contacts claimed to have been made is not
adequate." Employee produced 46 pages listing 297 potential employers contacted).
54. See, e.g.,
Woelfel v. Plastics, Inc., No. 470-54-0313 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 1985), sum affid, 371 N.W.2d 215 (1985) (four visits to Minn. Employment Services); Smith v. County Seat, No. 253-76-8678 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1984) (contacted one employment agency); Roland v. Southwest
Minnesota Opportunity Council, 36 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 446, 449 (1984)
(contacted Dept. of Vocational Rehabilitation and Minn. Employment Services).
55. According to a source employed by the Department of Labor and Industry, a
well-known "plaintifFs doctor" once explained to a compensation judge his reason
for always giving high disability ratings. The doctor's rationale was that, through
litigation or settlement, disability ratings of "defense" and "plaintifF' doctors always
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The tactical games played by employers and employees in
workers' compensation litigation usually caused animosity between parties, delayed recovery, and worked against the best
interests of the system as a whole.
C.

Problems and Costs of the Former System
1.

Study Groups' Criticisms

Pressure from employers, insurers, labor, and citizens'
groups to revise workers' compensation in the late 1970's and
early 1980's gave rise to several studies of Minnesota's system. 56 These studies identified numerous problems with the
system. Minnesota's cost of workers' compensation insurance
was the highest in the region. 57 A related phenomenon was
that Minnesota also had an unusually high litigation rate. 58
Many criticisms concerned treatment of displaced employees.
Critics complained that Minnesota's system did not properly
provide incentives for employees to return to work, and instead actually provided disincentives. 59 The incentives that did
exist were often unclear and inadequate. 60 The open-ended
seemed to be averaged to reach the ultimate disability award. In order for his patient
to be awarded the disability rating this doctor believed appropriate, the doctor would
assign a disability rating 5% to 10% above the true disability. As long as the "defense" doctor did the opposite to appease her client, the final award to the employee
would be fairly indicative of the employee's condition.
56. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. Leading the criticism of the Minnesota system was Professor Arthur Larson in a 1980 law review article published in
the William Mitchell Law Reviewv. Larson, supra note 3. Larson's criticism centered on
the philosophy behind the permanent partial disability benefits in Minnesota. Professor Larson favored a strict wage loss system as opposed to a system that compensated
for both wage loss and functional loss. See id. at 522-23. He suggested that compensation for functional loss serves no purpose in encouraging an employee to return to
work and often yields inequitable results between workers with the same basic injury.
See id. at 515-16. Professor Larson found Minnesota's permanent partial disability
system which incorporates wage loss and functional loss to be unduly expensive, litigious, inequitable, and time-consuming. See id. at 522, 532.
57.

GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON THE JOB, supra note 7, at 9 (Minnesota's insur-

ance rates ranked 12th highest in a study of 43 states. Minnesota's rates were 91 %
higher than South Dakota's, 70% higher than Wisconsin's, 38% higher than Iowa's,
and 26% higher than the national average).
58.

MINNESOTA

DEPARMENT

OF

LABOR &

INDUSTRY,

CONTROLLING

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION COSTS: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 19 (1984) 1hereinafter cited as EMPLOYERS' GUIDE]. See UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, supra note 8, at 71-72, 216-17.
59. See GET THE EMPi.OYIL.-S BACK ON TIHE JOB, supra note 7, at i (discussing tile
incentives for some workers to prolong disability rather then return to work).

60. See id.
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nature of the disability system,"' as well as the fact that employees with relatively low income often received over ninety
percent of their pre-injury take home pay in indemnity benefits,62
discouraged employees from returning to work
promptly.
The studies also found that the method of delivery for benefits was inefficient and encouraged litigation and adversarial relationships between employers and employees. 63 Another
contributor to the high litigation rate in Minnesota was the uncertainty regarding a displaced employee's continuing eligibility for indemnity benefits. 6 4 Neither employers nor employees
could be certain if they had complied with their duties and
taken advantage of their rights. Due to the system's complexity, parties had to hire lawyers to handle even relatively simple
matters.
The rehabilitation system also received criticism. The 125%
compensation rate for retraining encouraged displaced employees to spend several months to several years in retraining
programs. Critics charged that retraining was the least effective and most expensive method of rehabilitation, but was the
one the statute made most attractive to employees. 6 5 Opponents also criticized the lack of incentives for employers to provide proper rehabilitation and for employees to cooperate with
rehabilitation.""
2.

Confusion Regarding Diligent Search for Work

A major uncertainty of the former system was what constituted a diligent search for work. A huge but unpredictable
body of law developed as various courts struggled to define
diligent search for work. As a result, any claim involving substantial dollars or any hint of a diligent search for work issue
61. See id. at 35 ("open ended eligibility encouraged workers to gradually develop a dependency upon workers' compensation benefits").
62. See UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT. osupa note 8. at 39. For example, a single totally
disabled worker previously grossing $200 per week, with spendable earnings of $152.
would receive $145 per week in benefits or 95% of workers' prior net earnings. Id.
63. INSURANCE DiviSION RFCO MMENI)ATIONS, stupa(t note 2, at 205.
64. See id. at 127; GET TIlE EMI'I.OYEES BACK ON TIUHE
JOB, supra note 7, at 15 (the
law is not certain as to when benefits cut oil); UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT., supra note 8. at
211-13.
65. GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON TllE.JOB. Sl1)Y note 7. at 30.
66. INSURANCE DivisION RECOMMENI)ATIONS, Slri note 2, at 146; UNIV. OF MINN.
REPORT, supra note 8, at 190. 199-200.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/7

18

Crochiere: The Plight of the Displaced Employee Improves: An Analysis of the
1986]

DISPLACED EMPLOYEE

was litigated. In evaluating an employee's search, courts made
case-by-case determinations and looked to such factors as the
employee's disability, work searching technique, age, job skills,
education, and geographic location. 67 On close diligent search
issues, courts may have been influenced by the liberal construction rule."8
The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) has
at times attempted to approach "diligent search for work" issues using quantitative analyses. The WCCA has looked at the9
number of job contacts per week an employee has made.6
The WCCA has also considered the quality of job contacts
made. 70 Cases have been decided on whether an employee filled out job applications or just made phone calls, 7 1whether an
employee looked for work outside her immediate community, 72 and whether an employee moved from one community
to another. 73 The reasonableness of self-employment in lieu
of a diligent search with established employers has also been
considered, 74 as has the issue of voluntary or forced retirement. 75 On each of these issues, judicial standards were un67. See, e.g., Schlte, 278 Minn. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34; see also Cavanaugh,
361 N.W.2d at 53 (job skills and education); Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees,
358 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Minn. 1984) (age and nature of disability); Paine v. Beek's Pizza,
323 N.W.2d 812, 816 (Minn. 1982) (geographic location); Schlief v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 36 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 82, 84 (1983) (work searching
technique).
68. Although this proposition is not explicitly set forth in published cases, it is a
widely held belief among workers' compensation defense attorneys.
69. See, e.g., l'illis. No. 471-64-4127 (4 telephone calls per week insufficient); Engebrit, No. 472-46-3537 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1984) (1.25 contacts per week insufficient; 10 contacts per week sufficient).
70. See, e.g., l'elch, No. 473-60-6549 (important that "the factfinder can infer a
truly sincere desire and endeavor on the part of an employee to return to the labor
market").
71. See, e.g., llis, No. 471-64-4127, slip op. at 2 (telephone calls alone do not
consitute diligent search); Schlie/, 36 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. at 83-84 (telephone
calls do not constitute diligent search).
72. See Petschl v. Britton Motor Serv., 323 N.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Minn. 1982) (no
diligent search when employee able to drive 60 miles to metropolitan area, but fails
to include metropolitan area in job search). But ef Fredenburg v. Control Data
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Minn. 1981) (employee not required to drive into metropolitan area where employee's back condition would make drive painful).
73. See Paine, 323 N.W.2d at 815 (no diligence when employee removed self from
metropolitan area to "low employment opportunity area").
74. See generally LeMieux v. M.A. Mortcison, 306 Minn. 50, 234 N.W.2d 897, 900
(1975); Pitzer v. Capp Homes/Midwest Drivers, No. 473-36-6760, slip op. at 2 (Minn.
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. May 7, 1984).
75. See Henry v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 286 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1979).
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clear, largely because of differing views of what was "diligent"
in a particular employee's circumstances.
3.

Delayed Recovery Syndrome

The following excerpt describes the delayed recovery syndrome, an unfortunate but common problem facing the displaced employee:
An employee with a work-related back injury has been off of
work for three months. His doctor prescribed the usual
treatments, but the employee has not appeared to improve
and the doctor can find no objective evidence of a continuing physical problem. Doctor refers the employee to an orthopedic surgeon who also finds nothing physically wrong.
Yet the employee complains that he had terrible pain and
insists he cannot go back to work. 76
The delayed recovery syndrome can arise when an injured
worker's benefits from an injury outweigh the benefits of get77
ting well and returning to work.
The injury provides reinforcers for staying disabled. Such
reinforcers can include sympathy and attention, income from
workers' compensation benefits, escape from responsibility, revenge against the company, or resolutions of internal conflicts. 78 In any event, an employee with delayed recovery
syndrome will not return to work soon after injury.
The pre-1983 workers' compensation system, with its possibility for indefinite indemnity benefits without having to prove
permanent total disability, contributed to the delayed recovery
syndrome problem. The open-ended system allowed employees some luxury in pursuing ajob. This luxury provided fertile
soil for the delayed recovery syndrome to take root. Moreover, the delayed recovery syndrome had ample time to become established when displaced employees did not receive
especially prompt rehabilitation assistance and were sometimes ignored by employers who had written them off as insurance losses.
II.

STUDY

GROUPS'

RECOMMENDATIONS

Groups studying Minnesota's workers' compensation situa76.

EMPLOYERS' GuIDE, sttn(a note 57, at

79.

77. Id.

78. Id.
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tion in the late 1970's and early 1980's proposed various revisions to the system. While the specific proposals are too
numerous to discuss in this Article, major themes of the studies are adressed below.
A.

Workers' Compensation Study Commission Recommendations

The Minnesota Legislature formed the Workers' Compensation Study Commission (WCSC) in 1979. The purpose of the
WCSC was "to improve the system of providing workers' compensation insurance at fair and reasonable rates to employers
within the state." 79 The WCSC was formed in response to employer concern with workers' compensation insurance costs,
which averaged approximately three percent of payroll in the
state.8 0 Another concern was that neighboring states had competitive advantages in workers' compensation insurance rates,
and employers threatened to leave Minnesota if something was
not done. 8 1
Recommendations of the WCSC focused on providing better information to employees and employers regarding rights
83
and duties under the system,8 2 reducing the litigation rate,
and revising the benefit and rehabilitation structures to improve the fairness of the system and to encourage a prompt
return to work.8 4 Although many WCSC recommendations
were adopted in 1979,85 many problems identified by the
group remained in the early 1980's.
B.

Insurance Division Recommendations

In January 1982, the Minnesota Insurance Division published a study entitled Workers' Compensation in Minnesota: An
79. STUDY COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 5, at 1.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 31-32.
83. Id. at 32 (the Workers' Compensation Study Commission found Minnesota's
litigation rate to be a major factor in workers' compensation costs).
84. See generally Note, The .1i esola 1l'orler Conpensation Study Conmmission: Its Inpact Upon the 1979 Amnendments, 6 WM. MICHEIL. 1.. Rv. 783, 792-98 (1980).
85. See generally Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 Minn. laws 1257 (extra session)
(codified in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. § 176 (1984 & Supp. 1985)). For discussions of the 1979 legislation. see also Benanav, Wlorhe),'Compeinsation .-Iinendmens (?/
the 1979 Minnesota Legislatare 6 Wm. MrrciIEi.i. I.. REV. 743 (1980): Note. sipra note
84, at 783.
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Analysis with Recommendations.8 6 This report paid special attention to the relatively high insurance rates in Minnesota and the
reasons therefor. The Insurance Division concluded that Minnesota's workers' compensation system was deficient in nearly
every respect. The report recommended changes that would
encourage a faster return to work and reduce awards of huge
benefits where injuries were not severe.8 7 As expected, the Insurance Division was particularly sensitive to the problem of
the delayed recovery syndrome and its resultant long-term indemnity exposure. 8
The Insurance Division believed that the possibility of substantial permanent partial disability benefits encouraged litigation and discouraged recovery by the employee. The
Insurance Division, therefore, suggested reducing the significance of the permanent partial disability awarded. 8 9 Other recommendations called for improvements to the fairness and
balance of the whole system. 90 Generally, the Insurance Division recommendations
aimed to reduce the system's costs and
litigation. ' l
C. Citizens League Recommendations
On December 15, 1982, the Citizens League issued a report
entitled Workers' Compensation Reform: Get the Employees Back on
the Job. .)2 The report was prepared by the Citizens League
Workers' Compensation Committee. According to the Citizens League, "the main problem with Minnesota's workers'
compensation system is that the incentives in it are either inadequate to promote the system's goals or actually encourage
people to do things that are contrary to the goals.' ' 3 The report recommended that existing incentives be changed or new
incentives added to do the following:
1) Give employers clear and significant incentives to prevent injuries and illnesses and take injured workers back to
work.
86.

INSURANCE DIVISION RECONIMENI).TIONS,

nopi
ntc 2.

87. Id. at 13, 205-06.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 205-06.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 13.
Id.
GET Tl EmPI.OYEES IACK

ON TIE JOB, Spr(I I/Oic

7.

93. Id. at i.
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2) Reward employees for returning to work, not for being
disabled.
3) Encourage medical cost control while promoting quality medical service.
4) Discourage unnecessary litigation, without
preventing
4
litigation in cases of unresolvable disputes.11
Generally, the Citizens League recommended establishing
standard permanent partial disability ratings, reducing litigation, reducing uncertainty in the system, and reducing legal
and administrative shortcomings by providing information
about workers' compensation to employees and employers
through seminars sponsored by the Department of Labor and
Industry. 95 The Citizens League was concerned that the former system replaced too much of the pre-injury take-home pay
for certain employees, and therefore provided disincentives for
returning to work. It suggested that Minnesota replace most,
but not all, of an employee's take-home pay with indemnity
benefits .96

D.

University of Minnesota Recommendations

Professor C. Arthur Williams and others of the Industrial
Relations Center at the University of Minnesota prepared a
1983 report entitled Minnesota Workers' Compensation Benefits and
Costs: An Objective Analysis.9 7 This report attempted to cut
through the political mudslinging and rhetoric about the workers' compensation system in order to determine its true relative costs. The University of Minnesota Report criticized the
open-ended nature of temporary total disability benefits under
the statute; it recommended that indemnity benefits be terminated at maximum medical improvement and it supported a
350 week limit for temporary total disability benefits. -8 It also
proposed a two-tier system for impairment compensation.
The two-tier system was designed to give employers incentives
to offerjobs to injured employees, reduce costs, and guarantee
94. Id.
95. Id. at 39-42.
96. See id. at 39.
97. UNIV. OF MINN. REI'ORT, siluYl note 8.
98. Id. at 86-87. Prior to 1974. temporary total and temporary partial disability
benefits were limited to 350 weeks. See MINN. STA\T. § 176.101 (1967) (operative language regarding 350 week limits repealed by Act of June 4. 1975, ch. 359, § 8. 1975
Minn. Laws 1168, 1174.).
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pure impairment benefit tied directly to the severity of the
disability."!'III.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS

Pressure from business to reduce costs of the system and
pressure from labor and business to make the system more equitable caused Minnesota's Legislature to enact major revisions to the workers' compensation act in 1983. Many
revisions directly affected the displaced employee. In general,
the changes emphasized reducing disability by expediting the
displaced employee's return to work through (1) the prompt
involvement of a Qualified Rehabilitation Consultants
(QRC); I0 0 (2) a system of incentives for the employee and employer; and (3) the termination of the open-ended indemnity
system. The new statute attempted to clarify and allocate responsibilities for both the employer and employee in returning
the displaced employee to work. Finally, the legislature sought
to reduce uncertainty in the law and thereby reduce litigation,
which was recognized as adversely affecting the psychological
and motivational aspects of rehabilitation.' 0 '
The tenor of the statutory changes was reflected in the revised statement of legislative intent. To appease disgruntled
employers, the legislature specifically stated that "workers'
compensation cases shall be decided on their merits and that
the common law rule of 'liberal construction' based on the
supposed 'remedial' basis of workers' compensation legislation
shall not apply ....
A.

Overhaul of Section 176.101

The most significant changes of the workers' compensation
act in 1983 with respect to the displaced employee were the
99. UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, Stt/)1PIWnOte 8. at 126-27.
100. A Qualified Rehabilitation Consultant is "a person who is professionally
trained and experienced and who is approved by the commissioner to develop and
monitor an appropriate plan for evaluation and provision of physical and vocational
rehabilitation services for an employee entitled to rehabilitation benefits under Ninnesota Statutes, section 176.102." 6 NIINN. CODE AGENCY R. 5220.0100(5) (1985).
101. See generally KEEFE, INTRODUCTION TO THE 1983 WORKER'S COMPENSATION
ACT (1984) (discussing legislative changes implemented in the Act).
102. Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 25, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1324 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (1984)).
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revisions to Minnesota Statutes section 176.101.111" Subdivision 3e of section 176.101 became the central provision for
indemnity benefits. The open-ended system of indemnity benefits, at least for temporary total disability benefits, gave way to
a provision automatically terminating temporary total disability
ninety days after an employee reaches maximum medical improvement (MMI) or ninety days after the end of an approved
retraining program, whichever is later. 104 MMI is the date after which no further significant recovery from or significant
lasting improvement to a personal injury can reasonably be an0 5
ticipated based upon reasonable medical probability.1
The 1983 amendments provide that temporary total compensation can cease during the ninety-day period under several circumstances. Compensation ceases if (1) the employee
retires; (2) the employer furnishes work to the employee that is
consistent with an approved rehabilitation plan; or (3) the employee accepts a job with another employer.10 6 A job offered
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 176.101, subdivision
07
3e is commonly referred to as a "suitable job offer."'
The employee has fourteen days within which to accept or
reject a job offer.108 If the job offered is not the job the employee had at the time of injury, the offer must be in writing
and must state the nature of the job, the rate of pay, the physical requirements of the job, and any other information necessary to completely inform the employee of the job duties and
responsibilities. 109 The employee has the opportunity after receiving a written job description to bring it to a doctor or QRC
103. Id. § 42-68, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1338-49 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101
(1984)).
104. Id. § 48, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1341-42 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 3e (Supp. 1985)), anended by Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 461, § 8, 1986 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 544, 551-53 (West).
105. Id. § 29, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1327 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd.

25 (1984)).
106. Id. § 48, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1341-42, amended by Act of April 23, 1984, ch.
432, § 3, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 102-03 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 3e(b) (Supp. 1985)).
107. J. BENANEV & S. KEEFE, supra note 39, at 10-11. To be a "suitable job offer"
under MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(e), the job must produce an economic status as
close as possible to that the employee would have enjoyed without the disability.
108. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e (Supp. 1985).
109. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 48, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1341-42 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(e) (Supp. 1985)), amended by Act of Mar.
25, 1986, ch. 461, § 8, 1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 544, 552-53 (West).
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for an objective determination of the job's suitability. If the
employee questions a job's suitability, the employee can call
for an administrative conference to get a ruling from the Department of Labor and Industry. I 1 An employee offered a job
pursuant to subdivision 3e is eligible for temporary partial
compensation."1
Consistent with the former law, temporary total disability
ceases if the employer provides the employee with an appropriate job before MMI.'12 The pre-MMI job offer does not
have to be a "suitable job offer," in that it does not have to
produce an economic status as close as possible to that the employee enjoyed before injury. Ajob within the employee's restrictions, but at a lower wage than the employee received
prior to the injury, is called "light-duty" by the Department of
3 The difference
Labor and Industry.'"1
between a suitable job
and a light-duty job is only whether the job would bring the
employee to the economic status the employee enjoyed before
injury; the common phrases describing the job have nothing to
do with the physical requirements of the job. An employee
who accepts either a suitable or a light-duty job offer prior to
MMI is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits when
appropriate. 14 If the job offer prior to MMI is a suitable job
offer, no further temporary total benefits are payable.' '5 After
MMI or the end of retraining, though, any job offer by the employer must be a suitable job offer for the employer to benefit
from lower loss of function payments." 16
If an employee has been offered a job under subdivision 3e
110. An administrative conference to determine the suitability of a job offer is
provided for in Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 40, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 121 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.242, subd. 6(b) (1984)).
111. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 51, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1343 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3h (1984)).
112. Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 3, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 102-03 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (Supp. 1985)). See also Act of June 7, 1983, ch.
290, § 49, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1342 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3f
(1984)), amended by Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 461, § 8, 1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
544, 553-54 (West).
113. J. BENANEV & S. KEEFE, supra note 39, at 23.
114. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 51, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1343 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3h (1984)).
115. Id. § 49, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1342 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd.

3f (1984)).
116. See id. § 48, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1341-42 (codified at

MINN. STAT.

§ 176.101,

subd. 3e (1984)).
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and refuses the offer, temporary total compensation ceases and
no further or additional temporary total compensation is payable for that injury., ' 7 Moreover, an employee who refuses a
suitable job offer under subdivision 3e and subsequently returns to work may not receive temporary partial compensation
or rehabilitation benefits.' '
B.

New Standardfor Search for Work

The 1983 revisions completely deleted the diligent search
for work language from the temporary partial disability provision. 1 9 Consistent with the emphasis of other statutory revisions, the diligent search for work standard was transferred to
the rehabilitation provision of the act. The statute now provides that all workers' compensation benefits may:
be discontinued or forfeited for any time during which the
employee refuses to submit to any reasonable examinations
and evaluative procedures ordered by the commissioner to
determine the need for and the details of the plan of rehabilitation, or refuses to participate in rehabilitation evaluation as required by this section [Section 102] or does not make
a good faith effort to participate in a rehabilitationplan.120
Rather than leaving the reasonably diligent search for work responsibility in the hands of the displaced employee alone, by
this the legislature change assured the employee the assistance
of a QRC in the job search.
C.

Increased Role of Rehabilitation

The legislature in 1983 also made significant changes to the
rehabilitation provision.12' The changes replaced retraining as
the apparent goal of rehabilitation with a policy of restoring
the injured employee through physical and vocational rehabilitation to enable the employee to return to ajob related in type
117.

Id. § 55, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1344-45 (codified at MINN. STAT.

§

176.101,

subd. 31 (1984)).
118. Id. § 57, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1345 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176. 101, subd.
3n (1984)).
119. Id. § 43, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1339 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, sulbd. 2

(1984)).
120. Id.
13 (1984))
121. See
§ 176.102,

§ 83, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1355 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd.
(emphasis added).
generally id. § 69, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1349 (codified at MINN. STAT.
subd. 1 (1984)).
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and salary to his former job.' 2 2 The legislature repealed the
special benefits for on-the-job training and retraining benefits
23
to reduce the attractiveness of these options.1
A new provision in the rehabilitation section allows for reimbursement of reasonable costs for moving expenses of the employee and family. The reimbursement is given if a job is
found in a geographic area beyond reasonable commuting distance, after the employee has made a diligent search within the
present community.' 2 4 This relocation cost provision is in response to the difficult "diligent search" cases in which the employee risked forfeiting benefits or risked a lifetime of
2 5
unemployment because of a poor job market in a rural area.'
The relocation provision is optional for the employee, and a
refusal to relocate will not result in a suspension or termina2
tion of compensation.' 6
The standard for commencement of rehabilitation services
was revised to ensure prompt rehabilitative attention to an injured employee when the need for rehabilitation becomes apparent. The former statute provided that a rehabilitation
consultation had to be scheduled by an employer within thirty
days of the time the employer received medical information
that an employee was unable to return to the pre-injury occupation. 12 7 The standard now is not whether the employee can
return to the pre-injury employment, but whether the employee misses sixty days of work (thirty days for back injuries)
because of the personal injury.' 2 8 Once this objective test is
122. See Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 3, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 102-03 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (Supp. 1985)); see also Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch.
290, § 49, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1342 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3f
(1984)).
123. See Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 74, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1352 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 5 (1984)). An employee is no longer automatically
entitled to 125% of the temporary total compensation rate during the retraining period. The 125% special rate is now available only in unusual circumstances.
124. Id. § 79, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1354 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.102,
subd. 9(e) (1984)).
125. See, e.g., Paine, 323 N.W.2d at 815-16; Petschl, 323 N.W.2d at 789-90; Fredenburg, 311 N.W.2d at 864.
126. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 79, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1354 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 9(e) (1984)).
127. Act ofJune 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 36, 1979 Minn. Laws 1256, 1279 (extra session),
amended by Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 73, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1350-51 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 4 (1984)).
128. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 73, 1979 Minn. Laws 1310, 1350-51 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 4 (1984)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/7

28

!19861

Crochiere: The Plight ofDISPI.CED
the Displaced EMPLO'EE
Employee Improves: An Analysis of the

met, the employer has five days in which to provide rehabilitation consultation by a QRC. If an employer has medical information prior to the time specified above that the employee will
be unable to return to the job the employee held at the time of
injury, rehabilitation consultation must be provided immediately.' 29 By using both an objective time test and a displaced
employee test, the legislature sought to provide the employee
with a career adjustment expert as soon as it becomes apparent
that the employee's career will be altered by the injury.
D. Incentives Regarding Loss of Function Benefits
In addition to substantially changing provisions for indemnity benefits under the workers' compensation act, the 1983
legislative revisions had significant impact on the loss of function benefits. The entire disability ratings structure under the
former law was discarded. 30 In its place, the legislature instituted a "two-tier system." Under the two-tier system, permanent partial disability benefits are divided into two types:
economic recovery compensation (ERC)' 3 1 and impairment
32
compensation (IC). '
IC and ERC are payable for permanent partial disability of
the body as a whole. 3 3 The monetary award for each is determined by multiplying the percent of disability by statutory formulas. 3 4 IC and ERC are mutually exclusive. ERC benefits
for the same percent disability must "be at least 120 percent of
the impairment compensation."' 1 35 However, IC is usually payable in a lump sum in addition to earnings, whereas ERC is
usually payable on a weekly basis in lieu of earnings."6 Under
the new statutory scheme, both the employer and displaced
129. Id.
130. Id. § 173, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1404-05 (former version at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3 (1982)).
131. Id. § 44, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1339-40 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 3b (1984)).
132. Id. § 45, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1340-41 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 3b (1984)).
133. Id. §§ 44-45, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1339-41 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subds. 3a, 3b (1984)).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 63, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1347 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd.
3t(a) (1984)).
136. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
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employee have substantial control over which type of loss of
function benefit will be payable.
An injured employee who receives a suitable job offer before
ninety days after reaching MMI or completing a rehabilitaion
program is entitled to IC for permanent partial disability. If
the employee accepts the suitable job offer and returns to work
for at least thirty days, the employee receives the impairment
37
award as a lump sum payment at the end of the thirty days.'
If the employee does not accept the job offer, IC is paid as a
weekly benefit in the same amount as temporary total benefits
until the IC fund is exhausted, and the employee may not receive any other benefits unless the employee has greater permanent partial disability than already compensated.13 Thus,
by timely offering the displaced employee a suitable job, an
employer can limit liability for loss of function compensation
to IC. By accepting the offer, the employee receives the IC
benefits in a lump sum, in addition to his regular wage associated with the new job.
An employee who is not offered a suitable job before ninety
days after reaching MMI or completing a rehabilitation program is entitled to ERC for permanent partial disability. 39
ERC is paid weekly in the same amount as temporary total disability benefits, and continues until the employee returns to
40
work or until the statutory amount of the ERC is exhausted.
If the employee finds a job, suitable or light-duty, and works
successfully on the job for thirty days, the employee receives
the remainder of ERC benefits due as a lump sum payment
after thirty days of work. 14 1 Consequently, the employee has
incentive to return to work even if no job had been offered
within ninety days of retraining or the end of MMI. By returning to work as soon as possible, the employee receives a
137. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 50, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1343, amended by
Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 103-04 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3g (1984)). The 1984 amendments further require that the
30 day employment period is not substantially interrupted by the injury and the employee is still employed at the end of the period. Id.
138. Id. § 55, 1983 Minn. Laws, at 1344-45 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 31 (1984)).
139. Id. § 59, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1346 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3p (1984)).
140. Id. § 60, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1346 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd.
3q(a) (1984)).
141. Id.
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larger lump sum payment of ERC benefits to overlap with the
earnings at the new job.
A displaced employee who returns to work and is subsequently unemployed because of economic conditions other
than seasonal conditions may receive indemnity benefits in the
form of monitoring period compensation. 42 This compensation is paid until the monitoring period expires or until the
sum of the monitoring period compensation paid and IC paid
or payable equals the amount of ERC that would have been
paid if ERC were payable, whichever occurs first.14 3 The monitoring period is calculated by multiplying the percent of disability by the corresponding number of weeks in the economic
recovery schedule. The monitoring period concept protects
the returning employee from accepting a job and thereby terminating indemnity benefits, only to have the job vanish for
causes beyond the employee's control.
The new provisions are designed to provide clear incentives
for the employee and employer to get the displaced employee
back on the job. The employer will save money by paying IC
rather than ERC. The employee will receive more money to
the extent he receives loss of function benefits in a lump sum.
When the employee's functional loss compensation is paid
weekly, the employee loses the opportunity for an overlap of
loss of function benefits with actual wages.
Finally, an employee who has suffered a personal injury for
which temporary total compensation is payable, but which produces no permanent partial disability, and who is unable to return to the former employment for medical reasons atributable
44
to the injury is eligible for twenty-six weeks of ERC. 1
E.

Revised Standardsfor Permanent PartialDisability

Another major revision to the statute is the new permanent
partial disability schedule. Under the former law, a permanent
142. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 52, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1343-44, amended
by Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 5, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 104 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3i(a) (1984)).
143. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 52, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1343-44, amended
by Act of April 23, 1984, ch. 432, § 5, 1985 Minn. Laws 97, 104 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3i(b) (1984)).
144. Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 63, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1347, amended by
Act of April 23, 1984 ch. 432, § 12, 1984 Minn. Laws 97, 107-08 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3t(b) (1984)).
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partial disability award was a function of the disability rating,
the employee's pre-injury wage and the statutory benefit
schedule. 45 "Doctor shopping" and litigation over permanent
partial disability ratings were common under the former law
because permanent partial disability ratings were often subjective and varied widely among providers. The new functional
loss system incorporates the ERC and IC schedules to determine the dollar amount of benefits and the Commissioner's
detailed permanent partial disability schedule 146 to determine
amount of the disability.
Under the new disability schedules, loss of function benefits
can be awarded only if the employee has objective medical
findings.' 47 No longer do medical providers both identify a
malady and estimate the amount of permanent partial disability resulting therefrom. Under the new system, medical providers simply report their objective findings. Once the objective
medical information is documented, the extent of permanent
partial disability is determined from the disability schedule.
The new schedule is intended to "promote objectivity and consistency in the evaluation of permanent functional impairment
due to personal injury and in the assignment of a numerical
rating to the functional impairment."148

IV.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM

The goals of the 1983 amendments and subsequent legislative changes were to reduce costs in the system, to make the
system more equitable, and to encourage a faster return to
work for the displaced employee. The legislature also sought
to make the system less uncertain, thereby reducing litigation.
The following section analyzes the practical effects of the legislative changes on the displaced employee.
145. Act ofJune 1, 1981, ch. 346, § 75, 1981 Minn. Laws 1611, 1653-57 (repealed
1983).
146. The commissioner was authorized to make rules governing disability ratings
by Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 86, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1358-60 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.105, subd. 4 (1984)). The commissioner's rules are set forth at 8
MCAR § 1.9001-1.9025 (1985) (adopted Feb. 6, 1984).
147. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 33, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1329-30 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3 (1984)).
148. Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 86, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1358-60 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 176.105, subd. 4b (1984)), amended by Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 461,
§ 12, 1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 544, 555-59 (West).
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A.

Effect on Litigation

Excessive litigation in the former system caused increased
costs, animosity between parties, and delays in employee medical recovery, return to work, and receipt of benefits. The 1983
amendments were "designed to completely rework the law
based on principles of avoiding litigation and minimizing
disability." 149
1.

Permanent PartialDisability Rating

Under the former system, much litigation involved permanent partial disability ratings. 150 When the injury was admitted, as with the displaced employee, primary reasons for
permanent partial disability litigation were: (1) the amount of
money at stake; and (2) the subjective nature of disability ratings by health care providers.
For the system as a whole, the amount of money at stake has
not changed drastically. The IC and ERC schedules were
designed to result in roughly the same amount of loss of function benefit as was paid under the former system. 15 ' However,
a specific employee is not interested in the "big picture."
While direct comparison between systems is difficult a particular injury, in some instances, would have resulted in greater
loss of function benefits under the former statute than it will
under the current law. Nevertheless, employee demand for litigation over loss of function benefits should remain strong.
Even though it may be lower than before, the potential recovery is still substantial, especially to employees. Employees who
believe that a substantial amount of money has been wrongfully withheld from them will continue to sue to recover it.
These employees may have trouble finding lawyers to represent them on a contingent fee basis if recoveries are too small.
149.
150.

EMPLOYERS' GUIDE. s1oipi' note 57. at 19.
UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT. Spa/ note 8, at

151.

See

WORKERS'

216-17.

MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF IlABOR & INDUSTRY,
COMPENSATION

EFFECTS OF THE

1983

REFORMS: BUSINESS-SIZE OPEN CLAIM STUDY, PERMANENT

PARTIAL DISABILITY OPEN CI.AIM STUDY, AND CLOSED CLAIM STUDY 19 (1985) Ihereinafter cited as EFFECTS OF REFORMS I. Preliminary statistics reveal that 96% of employ-

ees with permanent partial disability clains in 1983 either lost no time or returned to
work. Id. If similar percentages hold tip consistently, the benefit level itself will decrease. See also Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 86, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1358-60
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.105, subd. 4 (1984)) (requiring aggregate total of IC
and ERC benefits to be approximately equal to aggregate permanent partial disability
benefits under old law).
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Moreover, employers may be more willing to pay claims voluntarily if the recovery is relatively small, just to be rid of the
52
administrative nuisance of disputing a claim.'
The litigation rate with respect to functional loss will be affected much more noticeably by the changes in the method of
determining permanent partial disability. Many litigated disputes under the former system involved situations in which the
employee's doctor assigned a permanency rating based on the
employee's subjective complaints, but the employer's doctor
determined there was no permanent disability because there
were no objective findings. 15 3 Since subjective complaints are
no longer sufficient to entitle an employee to loss of function
benefits,54 litigation of this nature should eventually
disappear.
The new disability rating schedule should also eliminate
much litigation based on discrepancies between disability ratings when doctors agree as to objective findings. Under the
former system, doctors not only diagnosed an employee's condition, but they also determined (on whatever basis they chose)
the extent of disability attributable to the condition. Even
when two doctors agreed as to the patient's general condition,
they sometimes disagreed substantially as to the permanent
partial disability rating. Under the new statute, a doctor diagnoses and documents the employee's condition; the disability
155
rating is provided by the Commissioner's schedule.
Although there is still room for some variance in disability ratings with the new schedule,' 5 1 any disparity between ratings
152. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. I (a) (1984) provides in part that attorneys representing employees generally are permitted to receive a contingent fee of 25% of
the first $4,000 of recovery and 20% of the next $27,500 of recovery by the employee. In most cases, attorney fees for employees' attorneys are subject to a $6,500
maximum, anended by Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 461, § 7, 1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
544, 549-50 (West).
153. See, e.g., McQuade v. Snyder Drug, 36 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 436, 437
(1984) (determining permanent partial disability rating involves examining subjective factors as well as objective findings); Lund v. Maxson, Inc., 36 Minn. Workers'
Comp. Dec. 146, 148-49 (1983) ("Pain as it limits functional use is a proper factor to
be considered in rating permanent partial disability.").
154. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
156. For example, if an employee has been treated surgically for a single herniated intervertebral cervical disc, one doctor may find excellent surgical results
("mild neck pain, no arm pain, and no neurological deficit") while another doctor
would find average surgical results (mild increase in symptoms with neck motion or
lifting, and mild to moderate restriction of activities related to neck and arm pain.").
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would be minimal, and parties would likely settle such a dispute before spending money on litigation.
2.

Duration of Indemnity Benefits

A second major source of litigation under the former system
involved disputes regarding an employee's diligent search for
work. The unpredictable standards for diligent search for
work and the stakes involved-indefinite indemnity benefitsmade it worthwhile for parties to litigate diligent search issues.
The repeal of the diligent search requirement' 5 7 and the
substitution of the "cooperate with rehabilitation" requirement 5 8 as the standard for employees' continuing right to indemnity benefits should reduce litigation for several reasons.
In most situations, the rehabilitation plan with which the employee must cooperate will still require a search for work.
However, an employee's work search will now be conducted
under the guidance and expertise of a QRC. The problems of
inadequately designed search strategies should be eliminated.
If a QRC is functioning as expected, the employee's search for
work will be logically structured and closely monitored. The
QRC should be able to determine when the employee needs
additional training to acquire skills necessary to be re-employed. With the prompt intervention of rehabilitative services, the eariler problem of an employee failing to appreciate
fully the necessity for a search for work should be alleviated.
Recent decisions indicate that the diligent search for work
standard by itself (i.e., without QRC assistance) is no longer
available to employers seeking to discontinue indemnity benefits.' 59 Citing the emphasis of the new law on rehabilitation
and employer cooperation in the return to work effort, courts
have shown little patience with employers who do not provide
rehabilitation when an injury is admitted.'"" Since rehabilitaIn this example, the disability rating to the body as a whole would be 9% using the
first doctor's evaluation or II% using that of the second doctor. MINN. RUIES
5223.0070 (1985).
157. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. E.g., Campeau v. Connolly Cartage Co., 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 784,
787-88 (1985); Kaste, 37 Minn. WVorkers' Comp. Dec. at 228: ll'estacoll. 37 Minn.
Workers' Comp. Dec. at 81.
160. See, e.g., Campeau, 37 Nlinn. Workers' Contp. Dec. at 787 ("The employer and
insurer take great risk in such a relusal to oller the necessary IrehabilitationI assistance.") (quoting 1l'eslacoll, 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. l)cc. at 81.
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tion plans must be approved by the Commissioner' 1i and since
QRCs are licensed and monitored by the Department of Labor
and Industry,6'2 the rehabilitation process has become a quasiofficial function.
Although the new system will reduce litigation by eliminating the confusing search for work standard and the potential
for indefinite temporary total benefits, employers will not
cease trying to discontinue benefits from employees they believe are not keeping their end of the bargain. However, to
terminate indemnity benefits early, employers must now either
offer the employee a suitable job or prove the employee is not
cooperating with the rehabilitation. 163 Assuming the employer
does not offer a suitable job, an employer's best strategy for
"catching" an uncooperative employee is to develop with a
QRC a highly structured, aggressive and monitorable rehabilitation plan. Such a plan not only provides a basis by which to
measure the employee's cooperation, but it also greatly improves the employee's chances to return to work. With more
displaced employees returning to work, the litigation rate will
decrease.
Another reason indemnity benefit litigation should decrease
is that fewer dollars are at stake. Employers will not prematurely discontinue benefits and thereby invite litigation if their
potential savings are relatively small in comparison with litigation costs. Without the prospect of indefinite indemnity benefits, the cost and risk of litigaion simply do not warrant
challenging every questionable case.
According to early studies conducted by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, ' 4 the litigation rate under
the new system has decreased markedly. Prior to the new law,
Minnesota's litigation rate exceeded ten percent. 1 5 A study of
cases closed in October 1984 showed that the litigation rate
had dropped to 6.6 percent.'" The Department of Labor and
Industry attributes some of the decline in litigation to administrative changes in the new law, better claims management by
161. MINN. STAT. § 176.102. subd. 6 (1984).
162. MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 2 (1984).
163.

See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
OF REFORMS. Sn/n1a note 151. at 19.

164. EFFECTS
165. Id. at 3.

166. Id. at 26.
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employers, and the objectivity of the disability schedules.1 67
The Depar~ment of Labor and Industry predicts continued reductions in the litigation rate as cases under the former law are
68

closed. 1

B.

Effect on the Delayed Recovery Syndrome Victim

Under the new system, fewer displaced employees should
succumb to the delayed recovery syndrome. Two major causes
of the syndrome are that the employee expects to receive a net
gain from being disabled and that the employee has emotional
or mental problems in dealing with the disability. 69 Several
aspects of the new system will help prevent future delayed recovery syndrome cases. The termination of indemnity benefits
ninety days after MMI or the end of a retraining program
makes "life-long disability" a less attractive career option. The
monetary gain from being disabled is no longer as lucrative as
it once was. The well-informed employee will realize the relatively short duration of indemnity benefits as well as the monetary attractiveness of returning to work quickly and receiving
IC as a lump sum. Not only the delayed recovery syndrome
victim, but also the true malingerer, will have less incentive to
remain "disabled."
An active QRC will also play a major role in reducing the
number of delayed recovery syndrome cases. Under the rehabilitation provisions,1 711 the QRC will meet with the displaced
employee relatively soon after the extent of the disability is apparent. Prompt intervention by the QRC will serve several
purposes that will help the potential delayed recovery syndrome victim. The QRC will inform the employee of his rights
and obligations under the system. The employee will not be
ignored or left to imagine how "the system" will treat her.
Further, the QRC should be able to detect emotional or psychological symptoms that would indicate a potential delayed
recovery syndrome case. Upon recognizing the symptoms, the
QRC can refer the employee to appropriate counselors to treat
the condition in its early stages. Perhaps most importantly, a
167. Id. at 29.
168. Id. at 3.
169. EMPLOYER'S GUIDE, supra note 58. at 79.
170. Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, §§ 69-83, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1349-55
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.102 (1984 & Snpp. 1985)).
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QRC will provide a structured rehabilitation plan that will not
allow the employee to remain away from the return to work
process for long periods of time.
Of course, the structure of a workers' compensation system
can not eliminate all cases of delayed recovery syndrome.
There will continue to be employees whose complaints of pain
baffle medical providers and whose emotional and psychological conditions effectively preclude them from ever returning to
work. To the extent these victims continue to exist and do not
qualify for permanent total disability, employers will benefit by
the limitations on indemnity payments. Employers will spend
less money on these individuals and will be able to dismiss
them as society's problems after a relatively short period of
time.
On the other hand, the victims themselves will have to find
support elsewhere after the workers' compensation system
ceases its benefits. Presumably, that support would come from
state welfare or unemployment agencies. The economic burden of the victim would then be spread among the state's taxpayers rather than only among purchasers of the employer's
product. The victims may have benefitted from their exposure
to rehabilitation aspects of the worker's compensation system.
Once these victims leave the workers' compensation system,
though, it becomes increasingly unlikely they will return to
work or be productive members of society.
C.

Increased Aggressiveness in Case Management

The new system provides employer incentives to maintain
active involvement in workers' compensation cases. Because
of the difference between IC and ERC benefits, an employer
can save money by offering or finding a displaced employee a
suitable job within ninety days of MMI or the end of a retraining program. Moreover, an employer can minimize indemnity
exposure by requesting and participating in a rehabilitation
program soon after the employee's injury. The sooner the employee returns to work, the sooner the compensation benefits
stop.
Employers will also pressure medical providers to get employees to maximum medical improvement. Under the former
system, maximum medical improvement was not a particularly
relevant date in the scheme of the workers' compensation syshttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/7

38

1986]

Crochiere: The Plight of the Displaced Employee Improves: An Analysis of the
DISPLACED EMPLOI'EE

tern. Now, however, employers have a specific interest in documenting when employees reach MMI. The goal of the system
has become getting the employee to MMI.
There are advangates and disadvantages of emphasizing
MMI as a goal of the system. The advantages are that the employee may receive better and faster medical assistance if the
employer is financially interested in the employee's recovery.
A potential problem, though, is that disputes will arise over the
time at which the employee in fact reaches MMI. The Minnesota Medical Association has published a schedule of estimated
recovery periods for certain types of injuries,' 7 ' but the schedule is merely advisory. Undoubtedly, doctors will disagree as
to when an employee has reached MMI. A subjective standard
like MMI inevitably leads to doctor shopping and litigation.
Because the extent and consequences of variances in medical
providers' opinions regarding the date of MMI have yet to be
adequately tested, the magnitude of the potential problem is
unknown.
D.

Increased Permanent Total Disability Claims

Under the former system, Minnesota had significantly more
permanent total disability claims than did Wisconsin. 172 This
situation may worsen as a result of the 1983 changes. Employees who under the former law received temporary total disability or temporary partial disability at the temporary total rate
for long periods of time had no special need to claim permanent total disability. Their benefits would not change substantially, and bringing suit to prove permanent total disability
meant hiring a lawyer and thereby giving up some benefits.
Undoubtedly, some employees under the former system who
qualified for permanent total disability never applied for that
status because they felt adequately compensated as they were.
With the termination of indemnity benefits ninety days after
MMI or the retraining program, employees with long-term and
total disability under the Schulte test 73 will now apply for per171. Minnesota Medical Association, Revised Tenporary Disability Duration
Guide (January 1984).
172. UNIV. OF MINN. REPORT, sapra note 8. at 216-17. From October 1, 1979 to
September 30, 1980, Minnesota had 53 permanent total disability cases to Wisconsin's 19. Id. at 216 For the samc period one ,ear later. Minnesota had 25 permanent
total disability cases to Wisconsin's 7. Id. at 2 17.
173. See Schulte, at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34.
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manent total disability benefits after their temporary total disability benefits expire. Whether the judicial standard for
permanent total disability will change as a result of the expected influx of cases is uncertain. The new statute has not
been in effect long enough for this type of case to reach the
court system. It is likely, though, that the number of permanent total disability cases in the system will rise as the new statute matures.
E.

Cost Savings

The new statute has resulted in cost savings and increased
efficiency for all parties. The savings seem to benefit employers the most. Unfortunately, certain new provisions may actually increase the cost of the system.
1.

The Displaced Employee

The costs to a displaced employee of a work-related injury
include his loss of function, lost wages, lost employability, and
physical and emotional pain. If the employer resists paying
benefits, the employee may incur additional costs in the form
of attorney fees needed to recover benefits and delays in receiving benefits.
The most important savings for the employee under the new
system result from the emphasis on a quick return to work.
Both monetarily and in human terms, the major cost of a workrelated injury to the employee is the period of unemployment
following the injury. Indemnity benefits do not fully replace
lost wages. Unemployment's forced inactivity is unhealthy
mentally and emotionally. An employee recovers physically
more quickly if she returns to work than if she has time to remain at home and think about the injury. 7 4 Therefore, to the
extent that faster rehabilitation services, cost incentives for
employers, and employee benefit structure incentives bring
about a faster return to work, employees benefit.
The new system appears to be working. Preliminary studies
indicate a twenty-eight to thirty-two percent increase in lost
work time for 1984 cases.' 175 The average duration for lost
work time dropped to thirty-four days for March, 1984 injuries
174. EMPLOYERS' Gunl)E, supra note 58. at 73.
175. EFFECTS OF REFORMS. s.HprW note 151. at 2.
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from fifty days for March, 1983 injuries.' 7 6 In a study of cases
involving permanent partial disability injuries, the number of
claimants in the 1984 sample who returned to work within six
months exceeded the number of employees in the 1983 sample
177
who returned to work within twelve months.
The new indemnity provisions may result in prompter distribution of benefits to the displaced employee because the new
statute addresses many situations that previously were left to
the courts. On the other hand, these provisions have become
so complex that an average employee has little chance of understanding the scope of benefits available and the rights and
duties of a party in each particular situation. The uncertainty
caused by the system's complexity detracts from recovery. If
parties do not understand the system and benefits are not
timely paid because of misunderstandings, the employee will
either forego compensation due or be forced to hire a lawyer
to recover the benefits long after they are overdue. An employee might even forfeit his rights to future compensation
and significant loss of function benefits as a result of not appreciating the significance of rejecting a suitable job offer
78
within ninety days of MMI.1
The most significant potential cost to the displaced employee is the risk of destitution through no fault of his own.
With indemnity benefits limited, the displaced employee who
does not qualify for permanent total disability benefits and
who cooperates with rehabilitation efforts but is unable to procure any job offer will lose indemnity benefits ninety days after
MMI and will lose all weekly benefits after ERC payments are
exhausted. 179 The legislature simply decided that certain employees with legitimate long-term unemployment could "fall
through the cracks" of the workers' compensation system.
2.

The Employer

In many ways, the statutory changes favor employers over
other parties in the system. Employers and insurers exerted
strong pressure on the legislature to reform the system in
176. Id. at 8.
177. Id. at 12.
178. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.

179. Id.
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1983.181 Judging from the changes made, the pressure was
largely successful.
Some savings to employers under the new system are fairly
obvious. Like employees, employers will benefit from a lower
litigation rate. In addition to incurring smaller legal fees, employers benefit by not having to waste managment time and
resources preparing for trial, meeting with lawyers, and attending various administrative hearings. Employers will also save
money to the extent employees return to work faster because
of the new system. Moreover, non-monetary benefits accrue to
employers when employees return to work promptly; employers experience less disruption to the work force and enjoy improved productivity when the returning worker has skills or
talents unavailable in a replacement. Obviously, employers
will save money by not having to pay indemnity benefits indefinitely for employees who do not qualify for permanent total
disability benefits. Finally, employers can lower workers' compensation costs by offering a suitable job, thereby taking advantage of twenty percent or better savings of IC over ERC for
loss of function benefits.18
Perhaps more satisfying to some employers than the monetary savings available is the degree of control the new system
provides employers. Under the former system, the risk of having to pay indefinite indemnity benefits even if the employee
was not permanently totally disabled, forced some employers
to provide jobs for displaced employees whom the employers
would not have rehired otherwise. The uncertainty and potential cost of indefinite indemnity exposure made employers uncomfortable. With the detailed structure of the indemnity
provisions under the new law, 182 employers can predict the
monetary costs and benefits of not taking back a displaced employee. Compared to its potential exposure under the former
statute, an employer can "be rid of" a displaced employee relatively inexpensively' 3 under the new statute. If for any reason the employer does not want to deal with the displaced
employee again, the employer can simply pay indemnity bene180.

See CITIZENS LEAGUE, suipra note 7, at 9.
181. See Act ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 63, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1347 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3t(a) (1984 & Supp. 1985)).
182. See generally supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
183. This statement assumes that the displaced employee does not qualify for permanent total disability benefits.
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fits until ninety days after MMI and accept the twenty percent
"penalty" of ERC. To many employers, a twenty percent premium on loss of function benefits is a small price to pay for the
opportunity to permanently dispose of an unwanted employee.
V.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Because of the relative immaturity of the present workers'
compensation statute, certain questions basic to the system remain unanswered. Some of the questions will be answered judicially. Other questions can not be answered so easily. Only
after its participants have had sufficient time to test the new
system will anyone be able to assess whether the 1983 changes
have had their desired effects on the attitudes and behavior of
employees and employers.
A.

Interpretative Issues

Since 1967, Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co., 1 14 has
been the leading case defining temporary total disability.
Schulte established that temporary total disability was primarily
an economic concept based on the employee's ability to find
and hold a job, given the employee's physical restrictions and
other life circumstances. 8 5 In order to prove temporary total
disability under Schulte, an employee had to perform a diligent
search for work. As was mentioned earlier, the legislature specifically repealed the requirement that an employee perform a
diligent effort to find employment following a work-related injury. The principal question now is: how is temporary total
disability defined under the new statute? Will the Schulte test
be modified to reflect the necessary role of the QRC in the
employee's work search? Is Schulte useless for the employer
who does not provide rehabilitation assistance but who attempts to discontinue indemnity benefits?
Is temporary total disability now solely a medical condition?
If an employer and employee dispute temporary total disability
status, and each had a medical report supporting its argument,
what standard will a court use to decide the dispute? Is an employee necessarily temporarily totally disabled until she
reaches MMI? How will the courts handle the situation in
184. 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130 (1967).
185. Id. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34.
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which doctors disagree on MMI? Will disputes as to MMI fill
court dockets? Should subconscious emotional and mental
complications be relevant in determining MMI? If so, would
the system revert to de facto indefinite temporary total
disability?
What minimal level of cooperation with rehabilitation efforts
is sufficient for an employee to continue receiving indemnity
benefits? Should the search for work within a rehabilitation
framework be evaluated by mechanical and objective standards
(for example, the number and type of job inquiries per week)?
Should a chemically dependent employee be required to cure
that disease as part of a rehabilitation plan? If neither the employer nor the employee does anything to comply with the statutory requirements regarding return to work, will the court
find temporary total disability?
It seems unlikely that temporary total disability will become
solely a medical concept. The statutory definitions of total disability upon which the Schulte court relied for authority 8 6 were
unscathed by the 1983 legislature. The court must still find
that the injury "totally incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings him income."' 18 7 Many of
the decisions following Schulte will have little precedential
value under the new law because the rules of the game have
changed. Nevertheless, the basic theory of Schulte- that total
disability is an economic concept- should survive the statutory changes. A series of transitional cases- cases involving
former law injuries, but decided by applying the spirit of the
new law- may foretell how the courts will define temporary
total disability for injuries occurring on or after January 1,
1984.
Schulte is not dead yet. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
applied a Schulte test to determine temporary total disability in
two recent cases.' 88 In Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc., 189 the
supreme court reversed the WCCA's finding that the employee
had not diligently searched for work. 190 The supreme court
concluded that the unsuccessful efforts by two rehabilitation
186. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 5 (1967).
187. Id.
188. Cavanaugh, 361 N.W.2d at 50; Hengewnhle, 358 N.W.2d 54.
189. 361 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. 1985).
190. Id. at 53.
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specialists to find suitable work, combined with testimony that
the employee could not return to a job without assistance, constituted sufficient evidence that the employee was totally disabled. ' 11 The court's emphasis in its reasoning on the failed
rehabilitation efforts may suggest that an employee's search
for work when conducted in conjunction with rehabilitation
assistance will be presumed adequate for Schulte purposes.
Employer and employee responsibilities in the return to
work process were discussed in several other transitional cases.
In Johnson v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 192 the WCCA held that an employee who requests rehabilitation services and is refused
those services by the employer still must make a diligent search
for work.l 9 3 Westacott v. Formac Corp., I,4 elaborated on theJohnson holding. In Westacott, the WCCA scolded an employer who
failed to provide required rehabilitation assistance but nevertheless attempted to discontinue indemnity benefits on the
grounds the employee had not diligently searched for work.
The WCCA stated that efforts by employees must still be reasonable and diligent, but those efforts should be conducted
primarily "within the framework of a rehabilitation plan developed through the cooperation and support of the employer
9 5
and insurer." 1
Westacott implies that search for work standards may be relaxed when an employer fails to provide rehabilitation services.
When the employer does provide those services, however, the
employee is obligated to use them. In Mayer v. Erickson Decorators, 196 the employee accepted a low-paying job after his injury
and refused to cooperate with a QRC who tried to return the
employee to a job with a wage scale similar to that of the preinjury job. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the employee's claim for temporary partial disability benefits, stating:
an employee is obligated to cooperate with appropriate rehabilitation efforts and, when those efforts are aimed at returning him to employment, to make reasonably diligent
efforts to obtain such employment if he is to remain entitled
to receive temporary disability compensation under section
191. Id.
192. 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 522 (1984), sum aft'd, id. at 529 (1985).
193. Id. at 526.

194. 37 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 79 (1984).
195. Id. at 81.
196. 372 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1985).
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176.101, subd. 2.197
The above cases suggest that temporary total disability will
remain primarily an economic concept, as it must for the incentives of the new system to function properly. The standard
for determining temporary total disability will shift from a pure
Schulte test, which focused solely on the employee's activities,
to a test evaluating the contributions of both the employee and
employer in the search for work effort. The trend of recent
decisions has hints of the maxim that one who seeks equity
must do equity. Each party must perform certain obligations
before it can expect judicial relief for improper acts or omissions of the other. If the equitable maxim indeed becomes the
basis for determining temporary total disability under the new
law, the parties will have the additional incentive to perform
their duties under the statute.
B.

Will QRCs Remain Independent?

A basic premise of the new system is that QRCs will be neutral parties with responsibility to facilitate the return to work of
the displaced employee. The Department of Labor and Industry licenses and monitors QRCs to try to assure quality services. 19 8 However, tensions in the system threaten QRC
neutrality. QRCs are private entrepreneuers. They understand who pays them (the employer) and what the paying party
wants to hear. On the other hand, the employee has the final
decision as to her own QRC. 99 If a QRC wants referrals from
the employee or the employee's attorney, that QRC may develop an employee bias.
Since an employee must cooperate with rehabilitation to remain eligible for indemnity benefits, the testimony of a QRC at
trial will be crucial in an indemnity eligibility dispute. If the
QRC testifies against the employee, prospects for further cooperation by the employee with that QRC are dim. If the QRC
testifies against the employer, the party paying the QRC, the
QRC may not receive business from that employer again. Of
course, QRCs have professional standards and undoubtedly
have good intentions. However, few would dispute that certain health care providers, another group of critical and theo197. Id. at 731.
198. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
199. See MINN. STAT. § 176.103, subd. 4 (1984).
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retically neutral cogs in the workers' compensation system,
have predictable biases and are retained by parties to litigation
because of those biases.
The conflict between private enterprise and neutrality may
be irreconcilable. The state has made the decision that QRCs
will be more aggressive and more effective as entreprenuers
than as government bureaucrats. If the system succeeds in
general-i.e., if on the average employees return to work
quickly- the risks involved in having private QRCs may be
acceptable.
C.

Will Attitudes Change?

Another basic premise of the new system is that participants
will accept its principles and respond to its incentives. For this
to happen, the Department of Labor and Industry first has to
educate employees and employers about the system. The Department has published informational booklets for employers
and employee organizations.2 0 0 Members of the Department
also speak to interested groups about the new law. Despite
these efforts, logistical difficulties in reaching even a majority
of the state's employees means that the people for whom the
system is designed are mostly ignorant of its basic principles,
not to mention its complex intricacies and incentives, until after the injury, when attitudes have already been established.
1.

Employee Attitudes

For the system to function optimally, displaced employees
must accept and actively use the rehabilitation process to return to work. The displaced employee is somewhat at the
mercy of the system, since benefits may expire before the employee has found a job, despite a diligent search for work. To
protect from "falling through the cracks" and to maximize loss
of function recovery, a displaced employee must strive to procure a suitable job offer as quickly as possible. Since the pre20
injury employer is the most likely source of such an offer, '
the employee must avoid, or at least supress, any animosity toward the employer. The luxury that existed under the former
system of waiting to find ajob elsewhere is not as certain now;
there is no "safety net" for an employee whose feelings against
200. See generallV EMPLOYERS' GUIDE, supra note 58.
201. J. BENANEV & S. KEEFE, supra note 39, at 8.
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the pre-injury employer interfere with returning to work. In
addition to accepting and using QRC assistance to return to
work quickly, employees must cooperate with QRCs in order
20 2
to remain eligible for full indemnity benefits.
Because they have little to lose and much to gain by cooperating with rehabilitation, most employees should adapt to the
rehabilitation concept with little resistance. Whether employees use the rehabilitation system whole-heartedly depends on
how they perceive its effectiveness. Some employees may "go
through the motions" to remain eligible for indemnity benefits
in the short term, but may not fully cooperate with QRCs. The
group of recalcitrants should be small, however, because rational employees will understand the advantages of returning
to work quickly.
A larger problem than that of recalcitrant employees will be
that of inflexible employee organizations. Certain unions have
historically made job placement of junior displaced employees
difficult by allocating "easy" or light-duty jobs to senior union
members. 20 3 The conflict between appeasing senior members
and making allowances for disabled employees still exists for
unions. The 1983 statutory changes added some urgency to
the displaced employees' need for available jobs, but it is uncertain whether this increased urgency will be sufficient to affect union policies.
2.

Employer Attitudes

The "correct" attitude for employers under the new statute
is to return displaced employees to work at modified jobs as
quickly as possible. Where necessary, employers should retain
QRCs for the displaced employees and cooperate with the
QRCs to expedite the return to work process. Finally, employers should maintain an active and conscientious interest in the
displaced employee's return to work. The primary tools for
shaping the desired attitudes are the two-tier system of loss of
function benefits and the indemnity provisions of the new
statute.
Certainly, employers will benefit by adopting the attitudes
and taking the actions necessary for a prompt return to work
by a displaced employee. By so doing, employers take advan202. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
203. CITIZENS LEAGUE, supM note 7, at 22, 36, 41.
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tage of the difference between IC and ERC and are able to discontinue indemnity benefits before they would expire by
statute. Many employers will adopt the "correct" attitudes and
behaviors for these reasons.
Unfortunately, the new statute has also made the opposite
behavior an attractive option. Under the former statute, the
penalty for not returning the displaced employee to work was
the prospect of indefinite indemnity benefits for a moderately
disabled employee. 20 4 The penalty under the current statute is
limited to increased loss of function benefits 20 5 and a maximum indemnity benefit period of MMI or retraining plus
ninety days.2 0 6 For many employers, the new statute makes it
much less expensive in many situations to abandon a displaced
employee. Not only will abandonment costs be less under the
new system than under the former in most situations, they will
also be more predictable. Employers and managers are less
intimidated by abandoning a displaced employee if the risks
involved are predictable and controllable. Consequently, it is
not at all certain that employers will choose to reinstate employees more frequently than they did before. It is likely,
though, that if employers do reinstate displaced employees,
they will do so quickly to take advantage of the IC/ERC
difference.
CONCLUSION

The current workers' compensation system for dealing with
the displaced employee is not perfect. Some employees will
"fall through the cracks" when economic conditions are such
that a suitable job is simply not available within ninety days of
MMI or the end of retraining. The system provides opportunities for employers to rather inexpensively ignore the displaced
employees. The statute is probably too complex for most lay
people to understand, with the result that many people will incur legal fees just to comprehend basic rights. The complexity
also invites errors caused by ignorance, and provides opportunities for those who know the system to take advantage of
those who do not. As with any statutory system, certain provisions are vague and will require interpretative litigation before
204.

See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.

205. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
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employees and employers will be able to predict the consequences of certain actions.
Despite its faults, however, the new workers' compensation
system should, in the long run, improve the plight of the displaced employee. The principal advantage to the displaced
employee is that the new system requires employees, employers, and rehabilitation personnel to take notice of, and to respond to, the displaced employee quickly. The former system
had no comparable premium on urgency, and consequently,
displaced employees were often ignored and attention to their
problems postponed. Under the new system, employers save
money by acting promptly, QRCs earn money by acting
promptly, and employees maximize recovery by acting
promptly. The new system's ancillary effects of reduced litigation, greater objectivity, and less system-wide cost also benefit
employees, employers, and society as a whole.
For the displaced employee, though, the most important feature of Minnesota's new workers' compensation system is its
direction. For the first time, Minnesota has taken drastic affirmative steps to address the special problems confronting
this worker. By recognizing these problems and by focusing
great energy toward their resolution, Minnesota has made a
commitment to reducing the human, social, and monetary
costs associated with the displaced employee situation.
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